Abstract: This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness, and (2) the question of how the threshold number of votes required for QMV should be determined. It studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the Nice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EU comprising 15 member countries, and (2) full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates. The proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes. The analysis of how the threshold affects power shows the trade-offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the Council to act. The main findings are: (1) that the weights laid down in the Nice Treaty are close to being fair, the only significant discrepancies being the under-representation of Germany and Romania, and the over-representation of Spain and Poland; (2) the threshold required for a decision is set too high for the Council to be an effective decision making body.
INTRODUCTION
The prospect of enlargement of the European Union by the accession of new member countries from Eastern Europe has posed fundamental questions about how its institutions of governance should change in response. The Intergovernmental Conference held in Nice in December 2000 was held to address these issues and produce an agreement on the basic structures of decision making as a framework for enlargement.
However the Nice Treaty has been criticised and should be regarded as only a limited success.
The main focus of the conference was on the extension of the range of decisions taken by Qualified Majority Voting in the Council and on the technicalities of how this system would work from 2005 onwards. There was considerable discussion of how the weighted votes should be allocated to each member country and what the decision rule should be in terms of the threshold. The treaty made provision for new weights for the existing fifteen members and for twelve candidates. It also provided for changes to the decision rule in terms of the size of the majority required for a proposal to pass. These changes have been analysed rigorously in terms of a priori voting power by Felsenthal and Machover (2001b) who concluded that, while the allocation of voting weights is relatively fair in the sense that the system gives electors in different countries roughly similar voting power, the threshold agreed on is set too high for the Council to be an effective democratic decision-making body. The present paper builds on that study, partly duplicating it, but also extending it. 1 I investigate the properties of the voting systems laid down in the treaty to apply both before and after enlargement, duplicating the analysis of Felsenthal and Machover (2001b) . I also consider the normative question of what the voting weights should be in order that the system is fair. I apply an algorithm for choosing the weights so as to achieve a given distribution of voting power among the members. This is proposed as a general procedure that could be applied in a more or less routine manner each time the membership changes: every time a new member country joins its voting weight can be calculated, and those of all existing members recalculated, by this algorithm in accordance with the agreed general criterion of fairness. The Nice Summit was held to determine the voting weights once and for all so that there would be no need to hold an Intergovernmental Conference every time new members joined. The general procedure proposed is an alternative that would have the advantage of giving fair weights in all cases. I also investigate how the choice of decision rule affects voting power given the Nice weights.
I address the following specific questions in terms of a priori voting power.
Separate analyses are reported for the Union comprising the existing 15 and after enlargement to 27. 1 Other studies of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers include Hosli (1993 Hosli ( , 1995 Hosli ( , 1996 Hosli ( , 1998 , Widgren (1994) , Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 2000) , Laruelle and Widgren (1998) , Nurmi and Meskanen (1999) , Sutter (2000) . A recent contribution on the Nice Treaty is Baldwin et al. (2001) . (1) What is the distribution of voting power among the member countries given by the voting system and weights in the Nice Treaty?
(2) How should the weights be chosen if the aim is to ensure that all citizens of the EU have equal voting power?
What is the effect of the threshold required for a decision by weighted majority voting on the power of the Council to act and also the powers of the individual members?
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the system of Qualified Majority Voting, and the Nice Treaty is described in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the measurement of power under weighted voting, using the power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman. The idea of fair weighting and reweighting is defined and the algorithmic approach described in Section 5. Section 6 presents the analysis of the distribution of voting power and the fair weights under the Nice Treaty. Section 7 presents the analysis of the threshold for Qualified Majority Voting and Section 8 concludes.
QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING
The Council is the most senior decision-making body within the EU under the Treaty of Rome. It uses different decision rules for different matters, unanimity for certain matters affecting members' fundamental sovereignty, but qualified majority voting for others. Its key features are: (1) that all members have a seat but their respective numbers of votes are different to reflect their different populations; and (2) decisions are taken by qualified majority voting with respect to a decision rule based on a supermajority requirement defined by a threshold. The threshold has always been set at about 71 percent of the total voting weight. Felsenthal and Machover (2001b) . The table shows, for each member, the number of its weighted votes, abbreviated to Wt, its percentage share and its percentage share of the total population. The final column, Pop(m), shows its current population in millions. Table 1 provides an overview of the evolution of the system since its origin in 1958. It shows that larger countries have always received a smaller share of the voting weight than their share of the population, reflecting the need to ensure adequate representation of small countries as independent states. The inference has frequently been drawn from this that the larger countries are relatively under-represented. The response to this has been to keep the threshold very high so that the power of the large countries is protected. This has meant that any decision has always required the support of at least two out of the big four countries (Germany, UK, France and Italy); therefore these members have had a considerable ability to prevent action. Such arguments however are based on a simple comparison of population shares with vote shares and ignore relative voting power. The fact that decisions are taken by block-voting, each member country casting all its votes together -in contrast to the European Parliament where MEPs are not constrained to vote as national groups -means that the relationship between voting power and weight is complex. It is well known that, in general, in a legislature that uses weighted voting, relative voting powers of members are different from relative numbers of votes, sometimes substantially so.
2 In making this comparison it is necessary to examine the rules of the legislature in relation to all the possible voting outcomes that could conceivably occur.
While choosing a high level for the threshold has the advantage of protecting the large countries against being outvoted too easily, it has the disadvantage that it limits the effectiveness of the Council by making it difficult, a priori, to make a decision and therefore imparts a considerable bias in favour of the status quo 3 . It also restricts the ability of all members to get their own proposals accepted, including those of the large members themselves, whose sovereignty it is meant to protect. The choice of the threshold was on the agenda at the Nice Summit but it was not changed despite the 2 This is described in Felsenthal and Machover (1998) . 3 Different terms have been used in the literature for this characteristic of a decision rule which reflects the ease with which it responds to variations in the members' wishes. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) use the term sensitivity. I use the measure of it due to Coleman (1971) who called it the power of the collectivity to act.
substantial extension of the scope of qualified majority voting to cover a greater range of policy areas.
THE TREATY OF NICE
The Nice Treaty amended the system of Qualified Majority Voting to apply from 2005. It laid down the rules of decision making on different scenarios for enlargement.
For each assumed scenario weighted voting is at the heart of the system but two additional conditions which must also be met have been added, in terms of the number of countries and population. 4 The system should therefore be thought of as one requiring a triple majority. For a proposal to pass three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the number of weighted votes equalling or exceeding the threshold; (2) a simple majority of the member countries; (3) a supermajority (62%) of the population must be represented. In fact, as Felsenthal and Machover (2001b) (2) Maximum enlargement. All candidates have joined and the EU has expanded to 27 members. I refer to this case under the provisions of the treaty as N27, and the weighted majority system as W27, respectively. therefore requires the support of: (1) at least 169 weighted votes, (2) eight member countries, and (3) member countries whose combined population is at least 62 percent of the total. Table 3 shows the equivalent data after all the current candidates have been admitted. The total number of weighted votes is now 345 with the threshold set at 255.
This represents a relative increase in the threshold to 73.9% of the total weighted votes.
Despite this increase in the threshold, however, it is now no longer possible for three of the big four to block a decision. As I show below, this increase in the threshold cannot be said to benefit either the Council or the individual member countries concerned. The use of power indices to study the EU has attracted a lot of criticism from Garrett and Tsebelis (1996, 1999) . The reader who is interested in this debate is referred to the given legislature using the Banzhaf power index, and second, analyses of absolute voting power using the Penrose index and three indices proposed by Coleman (the power to act, the power to prevent action and the power to initiate action). 7 The former, relative power analysis, is useful for making comparisons of a priori voting power between members within a given voting body defined by weights and decision rule, and also as the basis of a suitable choice of the weights using the algorithm I will describe below, but useless for making comparisons between different voting bodies with different weights and decision rules. On the other hand the absolute measures can be used for such comparisons and in particular to study the effect of the threshold. First it is necessary to give definitions.
A voting body has n members with voting weights, w 1 , w 2 , . . . ,w n and a decision rule in terms of a threshold, q. 8 The set of all members is N. All the indices are based on counting the number of swings, voting outcomes that can be changed from losing to winning by members changing how they cast their weighted vote. A particular voting outcome will be referred to as a division.
A swing for member i is a coalition (corresponding to a division) represented by a subset of members S i , N ⊃ S i , i ∉S i , such that j ∈Si ∑ w j < q and
A swing is a coalition where the total votes cast in favour of a particular decision fall short of the threshold without those of member i, but equal or exceed it when member i symposium in the Journal of Theoretical Politics in 1999, especially Lane and Berg (1999) and to Felsenthal and Machover (2001a) . 7 Banzhaf (1965) , Penrose (1946) , Coleman (1971) .
joins. Let the number of swings for i be η i and the total number of swings be η = η i ∑ .
The total number of divisions, the number of subsets of N, is 2 n .
Five measures of power are used, defined as follows. 9 .
(1) The Penrose Measure for i is the proportion of all possible divisions which are swings, denoted by π i :
The denominator is the number of possible coalitions among n members which do not include i, and therefore the maximum number of swings. Finding this for all i provides an absolute measure of each member's voting power which is used directly in the analysis of the threshold and as the basis of the definition of the Banzhaf index below. 10 8 It is usual in the theoretical literature to refer to q as the quota. However no confusion will result from retaining the official term, threshold.
9 Other power indices than these have been used, in particular the well known index proposed in Shapley and Shubik (1954) , which provides a measure of relative voting power often regarded as comparable with the Banzhaf index, but based on a completely different coalition model. The decision not to use the Shapley-Shubik index here is based on two considerations: first it was found not to perform well in a comparison of its empirical properties with those of the Banzhaf index, and second, criticism of its theoretical basis. See Leech (2000a) , also Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Coleman (1971) . 10 This measure has a number of names. It is often called the Absolute (or NonNormalised) Banzhaf index, or Banzhaf-Coleman index, most writers emphasising its relation with the Banzhaf index. However, since it was invented by Penrose (Penrose (1946) ) and I am arguing that the distinction between a normalised and a non-normalised index is more than a technical detail, it seems sensible to attribute it historically correctly. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) restrict the use of the term "index" to one which is normalised, and refer to this measure as the Banzhaf Measure.
(2) The Banzhaf Index for member i is the member's relative number of swings, the normalised version of the Penrose measure, denoted by β i :
This has the property that the indices of all members sum to 1 and can be interpreted as giving the share of member i in the combined capacity of all members to influence decisions. This index is used to analyse relative powers of members under the Treaty of Nice and also as the basis of the approach to the fair choice of weights.
(3) The Power of the Body to Act measures the ease with which members' interests in a division can be translated into actual decisions. It is denoted by A. The measure is a property of the voting body itself, rather than any particular member. It is defined as the proportion of all the theoretically possible divisions that lead to a decision.
where w is the number of winning divisions (i.e. divisions where the total number of votes cast for the decision at least equals the threshold). This measure is important when the decision rule requires a supermajority with a threshold in excess of 0.5.
(4) The Power of a Member to Prevent Action measures the ability of member i to prevent a decision being taken. It is denoted P i . It is defined as the proportion of winning divisions that are swings for i:
(5) The Power of a Member to Initiate Action is complementary to this, measuring member i's power to get its proposals accepted and is denoted I i . It is formally defined as the number of swings for i as a proportion of the total number of divisions that do not produce a decision without the support of i.
Both (4) and (5) can be regarded as rescalings of the Banzhaf index or Penrose measure. They are both identical to the latter when q=0.5 11 , since then there is no difference between the power to prevent action and the power to initiate action. However there is a difference where there is a supermajority decision rule, and they are useful in enabling the analysis to focus on these two different aspects of members' voting power.
The distinction is especially useful in the present context where discussions surrounding the choice of the threshold have centred on individual members' and groups of members' ability to block decisions.
The relationships among the indices are brought out by noting that we can write the Penrose measure as:
and,
Therefore the Penrose measure combines the individual member's power either to prevent action or to initiate action with the power of the voting body itself to act. 12 . These measures are used to compare the properties of different thresholds.
FAIR WEIGHTING AND REWEIGHTING
The first main question to be addressed using the measures of voting power defined in the last section is whether the weights agreed in the Nice Treaty are appropriate. I address this question using two different approaches. First I calculate the power indices and compare them in terms of a criterion of fairness, and second I use an iterative algorithm to determine what ideally they should be in order to be fair in this sense. I propose that the votes can be reweighed routinely in this way whenever a new member accedes. Felsenthal and Machover (2000) propose basing the allocation of voting weight on the principle of equitability whereby citizens of all member countries should have equal voting power. Decision making is modelled as a two-stage voting system in which the first stage is the ordinary political process in each member country and the second stage is weighted voting in the Council.
12 It is also of interest to note that the Penrose measure π i is the harmonic mean of I i and P i : 1/π ? = (1/P i + 1/I i )/2 (Dubey and Shapley (1979) ). Let it be required that member i should possess a voting power of t i , where
The problem is to find weights w i *, w 2 *, . .., w n * that have associated Banzhaf indices, β i , such that β i = t i , for all i. For notational simplicity I denote the target, the weights and corresponding power indices, as functions of the weights, by the n-vectors t, w and β(w).
Let the weights after d iterations be denoted by the vector w (d) , and corresponding power indices by the vector of functions β(w (d) ). The iterative procedure consists of an initial guess w (0) and an updating rule:
for some appropriate choice of scalar λ>0.
13 A similar approach has been proposed by Laruelle and Widgren (1998) and used by Sutter (2000) . It has also been used in Leech (2000b) . The question was discussed by Nurmi (1982) .
If power indices are continuous functions of the weights, and (1) is a continuous point-to-point mapping of a compact convex set into itself; it therefore satisfies the conditions of the Brouwer fixed point theorem and has a unique fixed point. 14 If the procedure converges to a vector, w*, then that will be the desired weight vector, since then:
w*=w* + λ(t -β(w*)) and so t = β(w*).
Convergence can be defined in terms of a measure of the distance between β(w (d) ) and t. The simple sum of squares
2 with a suitable stopping rule has been found to work well in practice. 15 The algorithm is set out graphically in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 about here 14 The continuity property does not strictly hold for small voting bodies. The Penrose measure is not continuous since it is a rational number and therefore the Banzhaf index is also a rational number. However for large n it seems reasonable to assume that the conditions hold approximately, and that the approximation improves as n increases.
It does not follow from this that a member's Banzhaf index necessarily increases when it is given more weight; in fact the opposite can occur. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p 253) call this the "fattening paradox". It is a property of the normalised power index only and is not shared by the Penrose measure. How serious this is for the algorithm employed in this paper is unclear since the fixed-point theorem on which it is based requires the mapping to be point-to-point, that is to associate a unique vector of power indices with each vector of weights. Then, convergence guarantees finding a fixed point. 15 For N15 the algorithm was found to converge to an accuracy, in terms of this criterion, of the order of 10 -8 , but it was not possible to get full convergence with a smaller value. For N27 it easily converged with respect to a stopping rule of the order of10 -10 . The power indices were computed exactly using the program ipnice (Leech (2001b) ). In Leech (2000b) the same iterative algorithm was used to compute fair weights for the International Monetary Fund Board of Governors with n=178. In this case the power indices were calculated using a different program suitable for large n (described in Leech (2001c) ); the accuracy achieved in terms of the sum of squares stopping rule was of the order of 10 -17 . Tables 4 and 5 present the results of applying this approach to the Nice Treaty.
VOTING POWER UNDER THE NICE TREATY
16 Table 4 shows the analysis for N15; the same information is displayed graphically in Figure 2 . In the first column after the names of the countries are the weights expressed as percentages of the total, then the Banzhaf power indices (columns (3) and (4)). The effect of the 62% population condition is evident from the greater power of Germany than the other three of the big four despite its having the same weight. It appears from comparing these two columns that the allocation of weights is very close to being proportional: that is, that weight shares and power indices are almost the same. This can be seen from Figure 2 (a), which shows these numbers for each country against a population scale, and 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Bz: Banzhaf; q 1 = the threshold in terms of weighted votes, q 2 = the population condition.
Applying the iterative algorithm gives the fair weights, listed in column (6). The only member countries whose weights change substantially are Germany and Spain:
Germany's weight has now increased to 15.12 and Spain's reduced to 9.34 percent of the votes. These results are shown in Figure 2 The equivalent analysis for N27 is presented in Table 5 and Figure 3 . A broadly similar story emerges with power and weight being roughly proportional, although the discrepancy for the big four countries is now larger, more than half a percentage point.
20
The population condition no longer favours Germany, its power index being the same as that of the UK, France and Italy.
However these are not fair weights in that Germany is under-represented and both Spain and Poland are over-represented: Germany has a power index of 7.78% compared with a target of 9.54%, Spain and Poland have a power index of 7.42% compared with targets of 6.61% and 6.55%; also Romania is under-represented. Applying the algorithm to compute the fair weights adjusts these discrepancies (column (6) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.000 Bz: Banzhaf; q 1 = the threshold in terms of weighted votes, q 2 = the population condition. The analysis so far has been in terms of the relative voting power of each member country within a given decision-making system, defined by a particular threshold, and no consideration has been given to what that ought to be. For N15 q was equal to 71.3%, and for N27, 73.9%. Now in this section the decision rule becomes the main focus of the analysis and I invesitgate its effect using the power indices due to Coleman as well as the Penrose measure. I allow the decision rule as determined by the value of q to vary over its entire feasible range from a simple majority, q=50 %, to unanimity, q=100%. In order to define the problem to be analysed clearly, I assume qualified majority voting in terms of a single decision rule, for the two scenarios that have been previously defined as W15 and W27, with the weights fixed in the Nice Treaty.
17
The analysis of this section uses member countries' powers to prevent action, P i , and to initiate action,I i , as properties of the voting system, reflecting countries' sovereignty, to interpret the effects of varying q. It also shows how the power to act of the Council itself, A, is affected. An important feature of this approach is that it allows us to study the tradeoff between members' powers to prevent action and the power of the Council to act, which is at the heart of the political development of the European Union.
The results for W15 are presented first, in Figure 4 .
18 Figure 4(a) shows the effect of the threshold on the power of the Council to act. Its maximum value is 0.5 when q=50% and its minimum value 2 -15 = 3.05E-5 when q=100%. It is clear that the value of q set by the Nice Treaty makes it very difficult to make a decision in the Council, its power to act when q=71.3% being only 0.0826. This means that only 8.26% of divisions, a priori, would result in a decision. Therefore there is a very strong conservative bias. similar results to those for N15. Thus, again, the conclusion is that choosing too high a value of q is counterproductive to a member country's own sovereignty within the EU. From the perspective of enlargement considered in general terms, it is proposed that fair weights could be determined as a routine or simply technical matter, by means of an algorithm, for any changes to the membership that may occur. This is applied to the two extreme scenarios considered.
The findings of the analysis of fair weights are: first, that the weights laid down by the Nice Treaty are approximately proportional to the voting power they represent;
second, that they are close to being fair for most members; third, that German and Romanian citizens will be under-represented, Spanish and Polish citizens overrepresented.
The results of the analysis of the threshold are: first, that the power of the Council to act will be very small because of the high level at which the threshold has always been set (about 71%) and will continue to be set unless the treaty is amended; second, the Treaty's provision to raise it to almost 74% when many new members join makes this aspect considerably worse; third, there is a trade-off between individual member countries' blocking powers and the power of the Council to act, but a direct relation between a country's overall measure of power and the power of the Council to act. The main conclusion of this analysis is that decision making within the Council of the European Union is likely to remain rigid because of members' being overly concerned with their own blocking powers, and for this to get worse with every enlargement.
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